Four infra-fiscal cases this week. One lesson.

Across four continents this fortnight, the same pattern: the real fiscal risk isn’t on the headline balance sheet — it’s in the commitments, guarantees, overruns and state-owned enterprises the framework doesn’t see.

A quick technical read on four live cases — what happened, and the one governance fix each one needs.

Week of 11 August 202611 August 20264 cases · 6 slides
United Kingdom · megaproject

HS2: £102.7bn — and up to 13 years late.

HS2 (“High Speed 2”) is Britain’s flagship high-speed rail line, meant to link London, Birmingham and the North. It has become the reference case for how public megaprojects go wrong.

£102.7bn
up from ~£33bn at approval; opening slipped to 2036–2039, the northern legs scrapped, £2.7bn written off

The Public Accounts Committee called it “a casebook example of how not to run a major project.” A third of the overrun is pure inflation — estimates that were simply not refreshed as the project ran.

Source · UK Public Accounts Committee · press, 2026
Global · the blind spot

Your fiscal framework is a flow statement.

Almost every fiscal rule watches flows — the deficit, the primary balance, debt-to-GDP. But a government’s biggest risks are stocks: guarantees, PPP commitments and state-owned-enterprise exposures that sit off the balance sheet and stay invisible until they fire.

6% of GDP
the average fiscal hit when a contingent liability is realised — and debt jumps ~15% of GDP (IMF)

A deferred subsidy or an implicit guarantee behaves like debt — but is reported, if at all, only in a footnote. Investors already price it; the framework does not.

Source · IMF WP/16/14 · OMFIF, 2026
Indonesia · getting it right

Recalibrating the toll-road guarantee.

Indonesia funds much of its motorway network through PPPs backed by a minimum-revenue guarantee (MRG) — the State promises to top up the concessionaire’s income if traffic falls short. It unlocks private capital, but it also hands the government a demand-risk liability that can balloon quietly.

Its new rules — Public Works Regulation No. 2 of 2026 — tighten unsolicited proposals and the MRG framework. A rare case of fixing the tool before the crisis, not after a bailout.

Source · Indonesia Public Works Reg. 2/2026
Ghana · the other government

SOE losses, post-IMF, threaten the debt path.

Ghana exited an IMF programme, but its state-owned enterprises — power, utilities — keep running losses. Because everyone assumes the State will stand behind them, those losses are an implicit guarantee: unpriced, off-budget, and quietly compounding onto the sovereign balance sheet.

It is the classic pattern: the exposure is discovered too late, when a bailout is already unavoidable and the fiscal cost is large.

Source · Ghana press, 2026 · IMF Fiscal Monitor
The through-line

The risk is on a balance sheet nobody keeps.

Overruns, guarantees, SOEs, deferred commitments — four faces of one gap: frameworks built for flows, blind to the stock of risk. The tools to see it exist:

VfMvalue for money
Choose the delivery mode on whole-life cost and risk.
FAROPPP fiscal risk
Quantify the commitment and the contingent tail.
GFSaccrual accounting
Record the deferred commitment as the liability it is.

Papers, models & FARO

Every fix above points at a paper in the Austral series, and at the instrument that implements it.

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