Who keeps the toll — and who carries the risk?

Four countries this week, one thread: infrastructure frameworks quietly decide who keeps the revenue and who carries the risk — and the budget counts neither until it fires.

A quick technical read on four live cases — what happened, and the one governance fix each one needs.

Week of 18 August 202618 August 20264 cases · 6 slides
Ghana · who keeps the toll

Ghana brings back tolls — and the State keeps 70%.

Ghana is reintroducing road and bridge tolls through a 20-year PPP with electronic, free-flow collection — after suspending manual tolling in 2021 because it “deprived the road sector of vital maintenance funds.” 38 upgraded and 28 new toll points.

70%
of gross toll revenue goes to the State; the private operator builds and runs the free-flow system over the 20-year term, then hands it back

The design question isn’t the technology — it’s what the State’s 70% cut is: a return on a public asset, a ring-fenced maintenance fund, or a general levy on drivers? Each is recognised differently on the books.

Source · Ghana Parliament · press, 2026
India · who carries the risk

India revives BOT by taking demand risk back.

India’s Ministry of Road Transport revised its Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) highway model in May 2026, adding traffic-risk sharing, revenue support and buyback to make road PPPs bankable again — after BOT collapsed to under 5% of awards.

<5% → 25%
the target share of highways awarded as BOT within two years — reached by the State re-absorbing traffic (demand) risk

Traffic-risk sharing works — it revives private appetite. But every point of demand risk the State takes back is a contingent liability: a top-up it may owe if traffic disappoints. Bankability bought with an unpriced guarantee is a cost deferred, not avoided.

Source · India MoRTH · revised BOT MCA, May 2026
Nigeria · the gap that isn’t funded

A long pipeline — but few deals close.

Nigeria’s infrastructure deficit is put at about $2.3 trillion. Its regulator (ICRC) has a growing PPP pipeline — but the measure that matters isn’t how many projects enter it, it’s how many reach financial close. Most don’t.

$100bn / yr
the investment needed to close the gap — while most PPP projects stall before financial close

The projects that stall aren’t badly designed; they’re not bankable. Between a good idea and a signed deal sits a viability gap — the shortfall between what users can pay and what the asset costs — that no length of pipeline fixes.

Source · Nigeria ICRC · press, 2026
Global · the pattern

One in three PPPs gets renegotiated.

Across the world, roughly a third of PPP contracts are renegotiated after signing — and it’s worst where the money is: 58% in Latin America, 42% in transport. The usual trigger is a cost or traffic surprise; the usual outcome is a higher tariff or a government payment.

1 in 3
PPPs renegotiated after signing — the rebalancing happens after the competitive tension is gone

Renegotiation isn’t failure — it’s the system working around risk it mispriced up front. But it quietly moves cost onto users and the budget, once the bidders have left the room.

Source · Guasch / World Bank · PPP renegotiation evidence
The through-line

Who keeps the toll. Who carries the risk. Who counts it.

A revenue share, a demand guarantee, a viability gap, a renegotiation — four faces of one gap: frameworks that decide who keeps the toll and who carries the risk, but count neither until it fires. The tools to see it exist:

VfMvalue for money
Choose the delivery mode on whole-life cost and risk.
FAROPPP fiscal risk
Price the revenue share, the guarantee and the renegotiation tail.
GFSaccrual accounting
Record who really pays — and when.

Papers, models & FARO

Every fix above points at a paper in the Austral series, and at the instrument that implements it.

ResearchPlatform