Five winners. 2,310 GWh a year. Today none of it counts.
Chile’s 2021 auction for regulated power supply awarded PPAs for 2,310 GWh a year from 2026, at an average USD 23.78/MWh — bids started at 13.32. On 1 October the energy commission’s final report took all of it out of contracted supply: every winner has terminated or is in default. Across the 2015–2022 rounds, twelve suppliers are out.
Part of the gap was bought again last year, in four-year gas-indexed contracts at USD 64.5/MWh. The new rules, final on 2 October, price the exit: a guarantee of up to UF 1,500 per GWh — 7.5 times the 2022 bid bond — cashed after one missed month, for regulated customers. And a backup generator that takes over at the original price.
South Africa delayed its first transmission PPP. On purpose.
Seven pre-qualified bidders. About 1,164 km of new lines. The final request for proposals was due by the third quarter of 2026. On 1 October the Treasury and the energy department moved it to the second quarter of 2027 — so that bidders see the terms of the credit guarantee vehicle before they price.
The reason given is the right one: so that “bidders and lenders have sufficient clarity to assess and price the transaction” — and to avoid “conditional bids and protracted negotiations later”.
A water utility that tells bidders how much of its cash is already promised.
On 9 October Cagece, Ceará’s state water company, launched a sewage PPP for 104 municipalities in four blocks: R$6.3 billion over 28 years, for 1.2 million people. Cagece keeps billing and collecting the tariff, and the partners are paid from it. So the tender pack carries a one-page table: how much of Cagece’s monthly collections already stands pledged as guarantees.
A further PPP’s share starts when it begins operating. Every bidder can see the queue before joining it.
Who pays first, second and third when an infrastructure bond falls short?
NaBFID, the government-owned infrastructure lender, is setting up a facility to cover shortfalls in debt service on infrastructure bonds. India’s central bank has raised the cover such a facility may give from 20% to 50% of the bond. A World Bank proposal dated 6 October stacks the layers behind it.
MIGA is weighing a further guarantee of about US$1bn. The stated goal: crowd in private capital “without proportionately expanding public-sector balance-sheet exposure”. NaBFID is wholly State-owned, so every loss the outside layers do not absorb stays with the State.
Same lenders. Same countries. What stands behind the borrower decides what comes back.
The GEMs consortium pools the loan records of 28 development lenders. Its 2026 statistics, released on 6 October: private borrowers default at 3.29% a year and lenders recover 69.8%. State-owned borrowers: 1.92% and 80.4%. Sovereign and sovereign-guaranteed loans: 0.79% and 95%.
GEMs credits much of that 95 to its members’ preferred-creditor status: a commercial bank holding a guarantee should not expect the same. The direction is the point. The more credible the support behind the borrower, the more comes back when it fails.
Someone always pays when a party walks away. Decide who before you sign.
Chile priced the seller’s exit too cheaply, and is repricing it. South Africa is building the buyer’s guarantee before the bids. Ceará shows bidders what is already pledged. India is writing the layers down. The cheap version of a walk-away is the one written into the contract — and into the fiscal-risk statement.
Thursday: what investors charge to finance Latin American power and gas — energy betas against the global benchmark, from the Austral platform.